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Abstract
Efforts to expand coastal State jurisdiction to include security jurisdiction in the EEZ were 
soundly rejected by a majority of the nations that participated in the UNCLOS negotiations The 
delegates present achieved consensus on provisions that accommodate the resource interests of 
the coastal State in the EEZ without diminishing user State interests in freedom of navigation 
and other internationally lawful uses of the sea in the zone. Continued efforts by some States to 
reinterpret the Convention to unilaterally and unlawfully advance their national interests in the 
EEZ impinge on traditional uses of the oceans by all States and are inconsistent with internatio-
nal law, long-standing state practice and the intent and negotiating history of UNCLOS. If these 
efforts succeed, the Convention will unravel over time and the international community will once 
again be plagued by a new wave of excessive maritime claims. Coastal State competency in the 
EEZ is strictly limited to resource rights, jurisdiction over resource-related offshore installations 
and structures, marine scientific research, and protection of the marine environment. Coastal 
States do not retain security jurisdiction in the EEZ, and may not regulate lawful military acti-
vities in the EEZ that are consistent with the UN Charter, UNCLOS, the Chicago Convention, 
and other relevant international law instruments. The creation of the EEZ was a package deal—
coastal States were granted exclusive resource rights and user States retained the high seas 
freedoms of navigation and overflight, and other lawful uses of the seas associated with those 
freedoms, which have always applied beyond the territorial sea.
Keywords :  exclusive economic zone, military activities, security jurisdiction, intelligence col-
lection, freedom of navigation and overflight, sovereign resource rights 
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I. INTRODUCTION
On 11 December 1982, Ambassador Tommy T.B. Koh of Singapore, Presi-
dent of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 
III), asked the assembled delegates at the final session of the Conference a rhe-
torical question:  whether the Conference had achieved its “fundamental ob-
jective of producing a comprehensive constitution for the oceans” that would 
“stand the test of time.”1 Ambassador Koh answered his own question in the 
1  “A Constitution for the Oceans”, Remarks by Tommy T.B. Koh, President of the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, adapted from statements 
by the President on 6 and 11 December 1982 at the final session of the Conference 
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affirmative, for a number of reasons, including: (1) the Convention replaces 
“a plethora of conflicting claims by coastal States with universally agreed 
limits…on the exclusive economic zone [EEZ]…” and (2) “the world com-
munity’s interest in freedom of navigation will be facilitated by the important 
compromises on the status of the [EEZ]….”2 
While that may have been the understanding of the assembled delegates 
in 1982, the “Constitution for the Oceans” is on the verge of collapse, as a 
handful of nations continue efforts to increase their control in the EEZ at the 
expense of the navigational rights and freedoms enjoyed by all nations in the 
zone. Efforts to expand coastal State jurisdiction to include residual compe-
tencies in the EEZ, like security jurisdiction, were soundly rejected by a ma-
jority of the nations that participated in the negotiations.3 At the conclusion 
of the Conference, the negotiators achieved consensus on Articles 55, 56, 58 
and 86, all of which accommodate the resource interests of the coastal State in 
the EEZ without diminishing user State interests in freedom of navigation and 
other internationally lawful uses of the sea in the zone.
Continued self-serving efforts by some States to reinterpret the Conven-
tion to unilaterally and unlawfully advance their national interests in the EEZ 
impinge on traditional uses of the oceans by all States and are inconsistent 
with international law, long-standing state practice and the intent and negoti-
ating history of UNCLOS III. If these efforts succeed and the “package deal” 
is abrogated, the Convention will unravel over time and the international 
community will once again be plagued by a new wave of excessive maritime 
claims that will threaten international peace and security.
II. THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
On 10 December 1982, nearly forty percent of the world’s oceans that 
were once considered high seas open to all nations were encompassed within 
a new zone created by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)—the 200 nautical mile (nm) exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The 
new zone, however, was not placed under the sovereignty of the coastal State. 
Rather, coastal States were granted “sovereign rights” in the zone for the pur-
pose of “exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing” living and non-
at Montego Bay, accessed at 21 Maarch 2019, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/conven-
tion_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf.
2  Ibid.
3  Satya N. Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne, eds., II United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A 
Commentary, (Virginia: BRILL, 1993), 491-821. [hereinafter Virginia Commentary II]
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living natural resources.4 The term “sovereign rights” was deliberately used 
to clearly distinguish between coastal State resource rights and other limited 
jurisdiction in the EEZ,5 and coastal State authority in the territorial sea where 
nations exercise the more comprehensive right of “sovereignty.”6 Article 89, 
which applies to the EEZ pursuant to Article 58(2),7 confirms this distinction, 
providing that “no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high 
seas to its sovereignty.”8
Throughout the negotiations, it became clear that creation of the EEZ was 
a package deal—resource rights would belong to the coastal State and, “in so 
far as such rights are not infringed, all other States enjoy the freedoms of navi-
gation and communication” in the zone.9 In other words, user States would 
relinquish their resource rights in the EEZ in favor of the coastal States, but 
would retain high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and other lawful 
uses of the seas in the zone.10
Notably, Article 86 reflects this package deal by acknowledging that the 
EEZ is a new regime, while at the same time retaining the distinction that had 
previously existed between the high seas and the territorial sea.11 The first 
sentence of the article recognizes that the EEZ is sui generis, and that certain 
resource-related high seas freedoms (e.g., resource exploitation and marine 
scientific research) do not apply in the EEZ. However, the second sentence 
makes clear that nothing in Article 86 abridges the high seas “freedoms en-
joyed by all States in the EEZ in accordance with Article 58.”12
Thus, within the EEZ, all States enjoy high seas freedoms of “navigation 
and overflight…,  laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other interna-
tionally lawful uses of the seas related to those freedoms, such as those associ-
ated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, 
4  United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS], art. 56.
5  Coastal States also have jurisdiction over resource-related off-shore installations and structures, marine 
scientific research, and protection and preservation of the marine environment. Ibid.
6  Ibid., art. 2; Virginia Commentary II, note 3 above, at 431-444.
7  Article 58(2) provides that “Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the…
[EEZ] in so far as they are not incompatible…” with Part V. UNCLOS, art. 58(2).
8  Ibid., art. 89. 
9  Satya N. Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne, eds., III United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: 
A Commentary, (Virginia: BRILL, 1995), 63-64. [hereinafter Virginia Commentary III]
10  At the opening of the fifth session, Ambassador Koh indicated “that the special character of…[the EEZ] 
calls for a clear distinction to be drawn between the rights of the coastal State and the rights of the interna-
tional community in the zone. A satisfactory solution must ensure that the sovereign rights and jurisdiction 
accorded to the coastal State [in the EEZ] are compatible with well-established and long recognized rights 
of communication and navigation. Ibid., at 65.
11  Ibid., at 69.
12  Ibid., at 60-71.
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and [which are] compatible with the other provisions of the Convention.”13 
These activities, with the exception of laying pipelines,14 may be undertaken 
without coastal State notice or consent and include a broad range of military 
activities such as: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) opera-
tions; military marine data collection and naval oceanographic surveys; war 
games and military exercises; bunkering and underway replenishment; testing 
and use of weapons; aircraft carrier flight operations and submarine opera-
tions; acoustic and sonar operations; naval control and protection of shipping; 
establishment and maintenance of military-related artificial installations; bal-
listic missile defense operations and ballistic missile test support; maritime in-
terdiction operations (e.g., visit, board, search and seizure); conventional and 
ballistic missile testing; belligerent rights in naval warfare (e.g., right of visit 
and search); strategic arms control verification; maritime security operations 
(e.g., counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation); and sea control. 
All States may also conduct non-resource-related maritime law enforce-
ment activities in foreign EEZs without coastal State notice or consent pursu-
ant to Article 58(2), which provides that “Articles 88 to 115 and other per-
tinent rules of international law apply to the EEZ in so far as they are not 
incompatible…” with Part V.15 These constabulary operations include actions 
taken to counter the slave trade (Article 99) and repress piracy (Articles 100–
107), suppression of unauthorized broadcasting (Article 109) and narcotics 
trafficking (Articles 108), the exercise of the peacetime right of approach and 
visit (Article 110), the duty to render assistance (Article 98), and the right of 
hot pursuit (Article 111).16
III. UN SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT IN THE EEZ
As a general rule, unless otherwise provided for in the Convention or other 
binding international instrument, ships are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the flag State in the EEZ and on the high seas.17 However, if a ship sails 
under the flags of two or more States, using them according to convenience, 
the ship may not claim any of the nationalities and may be assimilated to a 
ship without nationality, subject to the jurisdiction of all States.18 The UN 
Security Council can also authorize non-consensual boarding of foreign flag 
13  UNCLOS, art. 58(1).
14  Article 79(3) provides that “the delineation of the course for the laying of…pipelines on the continental 
shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal State.” UNCLOS, art. 79(3).
15  Ibid., art. 58(2).
16  See also UNCLOS, art. 86.
17  UNCLOS, art. 92(1).
18  Ibid., art. 92(2).
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vessels in the EEZ and on the high seas by carefully worded Security Council 
resolutions.19 
North Korea (DPRK) has been under UN sanctions since 2006 when it 
conducted its first nuclear test on 9 October.20 These sanctions, designed to 
disrupt the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, have 
been incrementally imposed over the past eleven years and include trade em-
bargoes, arms embargo, shipping restrictions, a ban on sale of luxury goods, 
financial sanctions and diplomatic sanctions.21 
Despite these robust sanctions, North Korea continues to evade sanctions, 
principally through illicit ship-to-ship (STS) transfers of refined petroleum and 
coal. Evasion of sanctions by the DPRK is facilitated by deceptive shipping 
practices that obfuscate the identity of the vessels, the goods being shipped, 
and the origin or destination of the cargo. Deceptive tactics include physically 
altering the vessel’s identification (name and IMO number); falsifying cargo 
and vessel documents; and disabling or manipulating Automatic Identification 
Systems (AIS) to mask movement or conceal the vessel’s next port of call.22
For example, in 2018, at least 263 tankers delivered refined petroleum 
products to DPRK ports which were procured from prohibited STS transfers. 
Assuming these tankers were fully laden (3.78 million barrels), North Korea 
would have imported more than seven and a half times the amount of refined 
petroleum allowable under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2397.23 
Sanctions enforcement at sea is based on flag State consent beyond the 
territorial sea. UNSCR 2375 calls on “Member States to inspect vessels with 
the consent of the flag State, on the high seas, if they have information that 
provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains 
items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by…” appli-
19  For example, following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, the Security Council passed a resolution 
calling on “…Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime 
forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary 
under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to in-
spect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related 
to such shipping laid down in Resolution 661 (1990).” S/RES/665 (1990), Aug. 25, 1990.
20  United Nations Security Council, Establishment of a Security Council Sanctions Committee (1718 Com-
mittee), S/RES/1718 (14 October 2006).
21  Ibid.; see also S/RES/1874 (2009), June 12, 2009); S/RES/2087 (2013), Jan. 22, 2013); S/RES/2094 
(2013), Mar. 7, 2013; S/RES/2270 (2016), Mar. 2, 2016; S/RES/2321 (2016), Nov. 30, 2016; S/RES/2356 
(2017), June 2, 2017; S/RES/2371 (2017), Aug. 5, 2017; S/RES/2375 (2017), Sept. 11, 2017; and S/
RES/2397 (2017), Dec. 22, 2017.
22  Dept. of State, Dept. of the Treasury, and U.S. Coast Guard North Korea Sanctions Advisory, Updated 
Guidance on Addressing North Korea’s Illicit Shipping Practices, Mar. 21, 2019, accessed 21 March 2019 





cable Security Council resolutions.24  Some States have argued that enforce-
ment actions in the EEZ, including the right of approach and visit, may only 
be taken by, or with the consent of, the coastal State, since the UNSCR spe-
cifically refers to the “high seas.” Given that most illicit STS activities occur 
in transfer areas located in the Chinese, Russian and North Korean EEZs, and 
that these nations are not currently conducting robust sanctions enforcement 
operations in these wasters, such an absurd interpretation of UNSCR 2375 
would effectively negate the UN sanctions regime in the East China Sea, the 
Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. 
  As a result, a coalition of eight nations—Australia, Canada, France, Ja-
pan, South Korea, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States—
have expanded their surveillance of North Korea’s smuggling activities in 
these waters, despite frivolous objections, by deploying warships and aircraft 
to better detect and disrupt STS transfers and other sanctions violations. These 
coalition efforts ensure that DPRK-related UNSCRs are fully and effectively 
implemented until North Korea denuclearizes.25
IV. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE EEZ
The United States has consistently maintained that nothing in Part V of the 
Convention restricts the right of all States to conduct lawful military activities 
in the EEZ. At the conclusion of UNCLOS III, the United States emphasized 
that all States would continue to enjoy in the EEZ:
“…traditional high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and the 
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally law-
ful uses of the sea related to those freedoms, which remain qualitatively 
and quantitatively the same as those freedoms when exercised seaward of 
the zone. Military operations, exercises and activities have always been 
regarded as internationally lawful uses of the sea. The right to conduct 
such activities will continue to be enjoyed by all States in the exclusive 
economic zone. This is the import of Article 58 of the Convention.”26
24  United Nations Security Council, DPRK Sanctions, S/RES/2375 (11 September 2017).
25  DPRK Sanctions Advisory, note 22 above.
26  17 third UN Conference on the law of the sea, plenary meetings, official records, UN Doc. A/Conf.62/
WS/37 and ADD.1-2, 244 (1973-1982).  Accord the signing and ratification statements of Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom. Declarations and Statements, United Na-
tions, Oceans & Law of the Sea, UNDOALOS, accessed 21 March 2019, www.un.org/Depts/los/conven-
tion_agreements/ convention_declarations.htm. 
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A handful of States do not agree with this position.
1) Of the 168 Parties to UNCLOS, thirty States purport to restrict or reg-
ulate military activities beyond the territorial sea;
2) Sixteen have enacted domestic regulations restricting military activi-
ties in the EEZ (Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Cape Verde, China, India, 
Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, North Korea, Pakistan, 
Portugal, Thailand and Uruguay); 
3) Two have not enacted domestic regulations, but on occasion object to 
military activities in the EEZ (Indonesia and the Philippines);
4) Seven claim a territorial sea in excess of 12 nm, which has the same 
effect as restricting military activities in the EEZ (Benin, Congo, Ec-
uador, Liberia, Peru, Somalia, and Togo); and
5) Five claim security jurisdictions in their 24 nm contiguous zone.27
These illegal restrictions take many forms and include:
1) restrictions on weapons exercises;
2) limitations on military marine data collection and hydrographic sur-
veys;
3) restrictions on nuclear-powered ships;
4) prohibitions on intelligence collection;
5) restrictions on navigation and overflight through the EEZ;
6) prohibitions on conducting flight operations;
7) prior notice or consent requirements;
8) application of domestic environmental laws and regulations; and
9) requirements that State aircraft file flight plans prior to transiting the 
EEZ.
None of these excessive claims have a basis in customary international 
law, UNCLOS, state practice or the Chicago Convention.
When discussing limitations on military activities, it is important to recog-
nize that UNCLOS does impose some restraints on military ships and aircraft 
at sea. However, none of these restrictions apply in the EEZ. Article 19 pro-
hibits certain military activities in foreign territorial seas for ships engaged in 
innocent passage, such as threat or use of force, use of weapons, intelligence 
gathering, acts of propaganda, launching and landing of aircraft and other 
military devices, military marine data collection, and intentional interference 
with coastal State communication systems.28 Article 52 applies the same limi-
27  Department of Defense, Maritime Claims Reference Manual (MCRM), Department of Defense In-
struction 2005.1–M, June 2008, accessed 21 March 2019, http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/code_10_
mcrm.htm.
28  UNCLOS, art. 19(2).
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tations to archipelagic waters.29 Submarines and other underwater vehicles 
engaged in innocent passage in foreign territorial seas and archipelagic waters 
must navigate on the surface and show their flag.30 Articles 39 and 54 prohibit 
the threat or use of force when ships are engaged in transit passage or archipe-
lagic sea lanes passage (ASLP),31 and Articles 40 and 54 prohibit survey ac-
tivities for ships engaged in transit passage or ASLP.32 Similar restrictions are 
not found in Part V of the Convention and therefore do not apply to warships, 
military aircraft and other sovereign immune ships and aircraft operating in 
or over the EEZ.
A. COASTAL STATE RESTRICTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
AIRSPACE
Efforts by some States to regulate military activities, such as ISR opera-
tions, in international airspace beyond the 12-nm territorial sea have no basis 
in international law. UNCLOS is very clear—coastal States lack competence 
to regulate military activities in the airspace above the EEZ. Coastal State 
authority is limited to the national airspace above the territorial sea and archi-
pelagic waters, where the coastal State exercises sovereignty.33 The airspace 
above the EEZ is considered international airspace and, like the high seas, is 
not subject to coastal State sovereignty.
Activities in international airspace are governed by the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation of 1944 (Chicago Convention).34 Article 1 of the 
Convention grants coastal States “complete and exclusive sovereignty over 
the airspace above its territory,” which includes “the land areas and territorial 
waters adjacent thereto.”35 Thus, a State may restrict or prohibit foreign air-
craft, military or civilian, from flying over certain areas of its territory for rea-
sons of military necessity or public safety.36 Moreover, state aircraft--aircraft 
used in military, customs and police services—are prohibited from flying over 
the territory of another State or land thereon without the authorization of that 
State.37
Nonetheless, these authorities only apply to national, not international, 
airspace. More importantly, with the exception of the prohibition on overflight 
29  Ibid, art. 52.
30  Ibid, art. 20 and 52.
31  Ibid., art. 39 and 54.
32  Ibid., art. 40 and 54.
33  Ibid., art. 2 and 49.
34  Convention on International Civil Aviation, (opened for signature 7 December 1944), 15 U.N.T.S. 295 
[hereinafter Chicago Convention].
35  Ibid., art. 1 and 2.
36  Ibid., art. 9.
37  Ibid., art. 3.
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of national airspace, State aircraft are exempt from the rules of the Chicago 
Convention, including observance of Flight Information Regions (FIRs).38 
The only requirement is that State aircraft operate with “due regard for the 
safety of navigation of civil aircraft.”39
 Thus, neither UNCLOS nor the Chicago Convention grants coastal States 
any authority over military aircraft operating in international airspace be-
yond the 12 nm limit. On the contrary, UNCLOS Article 56 specifically limits 
coastal State sovereign rights in the EEZ to the seabed, its subsoil and the 
waters superjacent to the seabed, with one exception—coastal State exclusive 
rights over the production of energy from the winds. Similarly, Article 3 of 
the Chicago Convention only limits military activities in national airspace 
and exempts State aircraft from compliance with the Convention’s provisions 
applicable in international airspace. Of note, Brazil’s efforts to designate the 
airspace above the EEZ as national airspace was soundly rejected by the In-
ternational Civil Aviation Organization Legal Committee, stating that Brazil’s 
proposal flagrantly contradicted “the relevant provisions of UNCLOS which 
equate the EEZ…with the high seas as regards freedom of overflight.”40
B. COASTAL STATE RESTRICTIONS ON MARINE DATA 
COLLECTION IN THE EEZ
In addition to sovereign rights over resources in the EEZ, coastal States 
are granted exclusive jurisdiction over marine scientific research (MSR) in the 
zone.41 Although consent should normally be granted, the coastal State may 
withhold its consent in certain specified circumstances delineated in Article 
246(5)(a)-(d), and it may suspend or terminate a previously approved MSR 
project as set out in Article 253.42
 Some coastal States, however, purport to regulate all marine data col-
lection in the EEZ, arguing that such operations are akin to MSR and are 
therefore subject to coastal State control.43 To the extent that coastal State laws 
38  Article 3a. provides that the Convention “shall be applicable only to civil aircraft and shall not be ap-
plicable to state aircraft.” Ibid.
39  Ibid., art. 3d.
40  Barbara Kwiatkowska, The 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone in the New Law of the Sea (New York: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), 203.  
41  UNCLOS, art. 56(1)(b)(ii) and 246(1)-(2).
42  Ibid., art. 246 and 253.
43  China, for example, prohibits all types of marine data collection without Chinese consent. Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, Order No. 6, art. 
8 (promulgated by the 3rd Meeting of the Standing Committee ninth National People’s Congress., Feb. 
26, 1998, effective June 26, 1998), http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONAND TREATIES/
PDFFILES/chn_1998_eez_act.pdf; Provisions on the Administration of Foreign-Related Maritime 
Scientific Research, June 18, 1996 (promulgated by Decree No.199 of the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China, June 18, 1996); Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Survey-
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purport to regulate hydrographic surveys and military marine data collection 
(i.e., military oceanographic surveys and underwater, surface and aviation ISR 
missions), they are inconsistent with UNCLOS, State practice and customary 
international law. 
The terms “research” and “survey” are not defined in UNCLOS. How-
ever, various articles of the Convention clearly distinguishes between MSR, 
hydrographic surveys, and military activities. Ships in innocent passage may 
not engage in “research or survey activities.”44 Similarly, “marine scientific 
research and hydrographic survey ships may not carry out any research or 
survey activities” while engaged in transit passage, unless authorized by the 
States bordering the strait.45 The same restrictions apply to ships transiting 
archipelagic waters in innocent passage and ships engaged in ASLP.46 And one 
of the high seas freedoms enumerated in Article 87 is “freedom of scientific 
research.”47
More importantly, Article 56 and Part XIII only grant coastal States juris-
diction over MSR.48 Thus, while coastal States may regulate MSR and surveys 
in the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, international straits, and archipelagic 
sea lanes, they may not regulate hydrographic surveys and military marine 
data collection in the other maritime zones, including the contiguous zone and 
the EEZ. Hydrographic surveys and military marine data collection activities 
remain issues governed by high seas freedom of navigation and other inter-
nationally lawful uses of the sea, and are therefore exempt from coastal State 
jurisdiction in the EEZ.49 
The distinction in UNCLOS between MSR and other forms of marine data 
collection reflects centuries of State practice. Since 1830, when the Depart-
ment of Charts and Instruments was first established (today’s Naval Meteorol-
ogy and Oceanography Command), U.S. naval ocean surveillance and ocean-
ographic survey ships have collected marine data and intelligence information 
seaward of foreign territorial seas to build oceanographic and meteorological 
profiles, maintain force protection, and inform naval commanders across the 
full spectrum of naval operations. Only in the last twenty years have these op-
erations come under scrutiny by a handful of rogue coastal States. UNCLOS 
is clear, however—coastal State authority to regulate MSR does not apply to 
ing and Mapping (promulgated by the 29th Meeting of the Standing Committee ninth National 
People’s Congress, Aug. 29, 2002, effective Dec. 1, 2002).
44  UNCLOS, art. 19(2)(j).
45  Ibid., art. 40.
46  Ibid., art. 52 and 54.
47  Ibid., art. 87(1)(f).
48  Ibid., art. 56(1)(b)(ii) and 246(1)-(2).
49  Ibid., art. 58, 86 and 87.
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other separate and distinct activities, such as oceanographic surveys and mili-
tary marine data collection efforts, including ISR operations.
C. INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAIS-
SANCE OPERATIONS IN THE EEZ
Having failed at UNCLOS III to include security jurisdiction as a coastal 
State competency in the EEZ, a few States cite Articles 59, 88 and 301 to 
support their regulation of foreign military activities in their EEZ.50 In effect, 
these States argue that security jurisdiction was retained as a residual right 
under Article 59 and that military activities violate the peaceful purposes pro-
visions of the Convention (Articles 88 and 301).51 These arguments are not 
supported by a plain reading of UNCLOS, State practice, the Chicago Con-
vention, or any other applicable international instrument.
UNCLOS addresses intelligence collection in only one article—Article 
19(2)(c). That provision restricts foreign ships transiting the territorial sea in 
innocent passage from engaging in “any act aimed at collecting information 
to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal state.”52 An analogous 
limitation does not appear in Part V of the Convention regarding the EEZ. 
Similarly, Article 3 of the Chicago Convention limits coastal State authority 
over military aircraft to national airspace. Coastal States may not regulate 
State aircraft activities seaward of the territorial sea in international airspace.53 
50  For example, on June 29, 2011, China warned the United States to stop conducting Sensitive Recon-
naissance Operations (SRO) near the Chinese coast because they violate PRC sovereignty and security. 
Kenneth Allen & Jana Allen, “Assessing China’s Response to U.S. Reconnaissance Flights,” China Brief 
11 no. 16 (2011). Similarly, on August 29, 2014, China warned the United States to stop its SRO flights near 
Chinese territory, claiming that the surveillance activities undermine China’s security interests and could 
lead to “undesirable incidents.” Sophie Brown, Stop Spy Flights, China Warns the U.S., CNN, (Aug. 29, 
2014), accessed 21 March 2019, http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/29/world /asia/china-us-spy-flights/.
51  Article 59 provides: “In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or 
jurisdiction to the coastal State or to other States within the exclusive economic zone, 
and a conflict arises between the interests of the coastal State and any other State or 
States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all the 
relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the interests 
involved to the parties as well as to the international community as a whole.” Article 
88, which applies to the EEZ via Article 58, provides: “The high seas shall be reserved 
for peaceful purposes.” Article 301 provides: “In exercising their rights and perform-
ing their duties under this Convention, States Parties shall refrain from any threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in 
the Charter of the United Nations.” UNCLOS, art. 59, 88 and 301.
52  Ibid., art. 19(20)(c).
53  Chicago Convention, art. 3.
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The text of UNCLOS and the Chicago Convention reflect State practice 
since 1945. During the Cold War, warships and military aircraft from the 
NATO alliance and the Soviet bloc routinely collected intelligence and con-
ducted military marine data collection operations in what is today the EEZ. 
Such surveillance activities were lawful and acceptable to NATO so long as 
Soviet ships and aircraft remained outside of the territorial sea and complied 
with the obligations of the 1972 International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea (COLREGS)54 and the 1972 US–USSR Agreement on the 
Prevention of Incidents on the High Seas (INCSEA).55 Even on those rare oc-
casions when coastal States objected to foreign ISR flights off their coast, nor-
mally they claimed that the aircraft intruded into “national” airspace, rather 
than questioning the legality of intelligence collection generally.56 This long-
standing State practice continues today, as military surveillance aircraft and 
survey ships from a number of countries, including Australia, China, Japan, 
NATO, Russia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom (to name a few), oper-
ate on, under and over the world’s oceans collecting marine data for military 
use.
Of note, the issue of aerial reconnaissance was brought before the UN 
Security Council following a series of incidents involving the United States 
and the Soviet Union. During the deliberations, the Soviet delegation specifi-
cally rejected the position that a coastal State had the right to interfere with 
intelligence collection activities beyond national airspace.57 The United King-
dom delegations similarly indicated without objection that aerial surveillance 
directed at a coastal State from international airspace was consistent with in-
ternational law and the UN Charter.58
54  Convention on International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, (opened for signature 20 Oc-
tober 1972), 28 UST 3459, TIAS 8587, 1050 U.N.T.S. 17.
55  Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, Dec. 29, 1972, 
852 U.N.T.S. 151, as amended by the Proto-col thereto, May 22, 1973, 24 UST 1063, TIAS No. 7624, and 
by the 1998 exchange of diplomatic notes.
56  For example, in June 2012 Syrian forces shot down an unarmed Turkish RF-4E Phantom reconnaissance 
aircraft. Damascus justified its actions claiming that the Turkish spy plane was operating within Syrian 
national airspace when it was engaged. The Syrians did not allege that ISR operations, in general, were per 
se illegal. Eric Schmitt & Sebnem Arsu, “Backed By NATO, Turkey Steps Up Warning to Syria”, NEW 
YORK TIMES (June 27, 2012), accessed 21 March 2019, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/world/
middleeast/turkey-seeks-nato-backing-in-syria-dispute.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. See also Oliver J. Lis-
sitzyn, “Electronic Reconnaissance from the High Seas and International Law” in The Role of International 
Law and an Evolving Oceans Law, Richard B. Lillich & John Norton Moore, eds. (Rhode Island: Naval War 
College, 1980), 566–567, 574–575, 578–579.
57  Lissitzyn, ibid.
58  Ibid.
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With regard to peaceful purposes, Article 301 of the Convention calls on 
States to “refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any State….”59 The language is identical to text 
in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter on the prohibition of armed aggression in the 
relations among States.60 
UNCLOS Article 19 makes a clear distinction between “threat or use of 
force” on the one hand, and other military-related activities, on the other. Ar-
ticle 19(2)(a) repeats the language of Article 301, prohibiting ships in innocent 
passage from engaging in “any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State.”61 The re-
maining subparagraphs of Article 19(2) restrict other military activities in the 
territorial sea.62 The distinction in Article 19 between “threat or use of force” 
and other types of military activities clearly demonstrates that UNCLOS does 
not automatically equate use of force with these other military acts. 
The “peaceful purposes” language has its origin in the text of UN General 
Assembly Resolution 2749 (1970), which declared that the sea-bed beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction was reserved exclusively for peaceful pur-
poses.63 A proposal by a group of developing nations to include a version of 
Article 301 in Article 88 was not adopted.64 Similarly, an effort to include the 
new Article 301 in Part V of the Convention was also defeated “by maritime 
States on the ground that security matters should not be considered within the 
EEZ regime.”65
59  UNCLOS, art. 301.
60  UN Charter Article 2(4) provides that “All Members shall refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations.” Charter of the United Nations, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, Oct. 24, 1945.
61  UNCLOS, art. 19(2)(a).
62  Other military activities prohibited by Article 19 include: (b) any exercise or prac-
tice with weapons of any kind; (c) any act aimed at collecting information to the 
prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal State; (d) any act of propaganda 
aimed at affecting the defense or security of the coastal State; (e) the launching, land-
ing or taking on board of any aircraft; (f) the launching, landing or taking on board of 
any military device; (j) the carrying out of research or survey activities; and (k) any 
act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or 
installations of the coastal State. UNCLOS, art. 19.
63  United Nations General Assembly, Res. 2749 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/Res/2749 (Dec. 
17, 1970).
64  Virginia Commentary III, note 9 above, at 90.




Nonetheless, some developing States took the position that Articles 88 and 
301 would prohibit all military activities in the oceans. Ecuador, for exam-
ple, argued that “the use of the ocean space for exclusively peaceful purposes 
must mean complete demilitarization and the exclusion from it of all military 
activities.”66 This strict interpretation of the “peaceful purposes” language was 
opposed by the maritime States, arguing instead that the test of whether an ac-
tivity was considered “peaceful” was determined by the UN Charter and other 
obligations of international law.67
The United States, for example, stated that: 
“The term “peaceful purposes” did not, of course, preclude military ac-
tivities generally. The United States has consistently held that the conduct 
of military activities for peaceful purposes was in full accord with the 
Charter of the United Nations and with the principles of international 
law. Any specific limitation on military activities would require the ne-
gotiation of a detailed arms control agreement. The Conference was not 
charged with such a purpose and was not prepared for such a negotiation. 
Any attempt to turn the Conference’s attention to such a complex task 
would quickly bring to an end current efforts to negotiate a law of the sea 
convention.”68
Most commentators that have addressed this issue agree with the United 
States:
“…that based on various provisions of the Convention…, it is logical…to 
interpret the peaceful…purposes clauses as prohibiting only those activi-
ties which are not consistent with the UN Charter. It may be concluded ac-
cordingly that…Articles 88 and 301 do not prohibit all military activities 
on the high seas and in EEZs, but only those that threaten or use force in 
a manner inconsistent with the UN Charter.”69 
Thus, the determination of whether an activity is “peaceful” is made under 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and the “peaceful purposes” provisions must 
be read in conjunction with the general body of international law, including 
the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense reflected in Article 
51 of the UN Charter.70 
66  Virginia Commentary III, note 9 above, at 88-89.
67  Ibid., at 89-91.
68  Ibid., at 89. See also V THIRD UN CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 67TH PLENARY 
MEETING, OFFICIAL RECORDS, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WS/67, at 62 (1973–1982).
69  Moritaka Hayashi, “Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities in the EEZ: Definition of Key Terms,” 
29 Marine Policy 29 (2005): 123–137.
70  In the commentary accompanying the U.S. President’s letter of transmittal of the Convention to the Sen-
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To accept that all military activities are, by their nature, inconsistent with 
the “peaceful purposes” provisions would be contrary to the decisions of the 
UN Security Council, which indicate that “military activities consistent with 
the principles of international law embodied in [Article 2(4) and Article 51 
of] the Charter of the United Nations…are not prohibited by the Convention 
on the Law of the Sea.”71 The International Court of Justice has similarly 
ruled that naval maneuvers conducted by the U.S. Navy from 1982 to 1985 
off the coast of Nicaragua during the U.S.-backed counter-revolution against 
the Sandinista government did not constitute a threat or use of force against 
Nicaragua.72 
The Security Council has likewise determined that peacetime intelligence 
collection is not considered a “threat or use of force against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal state… in violation 
of the Charter of the United Nations.” Following the shoot down of an Ameri-
can U-2 spy plane near Sverdlovsk in1960, an effort by the Soviet Union to 
have a Security Council resolution adopted that would have labelled the U-2 
flights as “acts of aggression” under the Charter failed by a vote of 7 to 2 (with 
2 abstentions), thereby confirming that peacetime intelligence collection is 
consistent with the UN Charter.73 Two months later, the Soviets shot down an 
America RB-47H spy plane while it was conducting an ISR mission over the 
Barents Sea near the Kola Peninsula. Again, the Soviets introduced a draft 
resolution that would have labelled the surveillance mission an “act of aggres-
sion” under the Charter. The draft resolution was rejected by a vote of 9 to 2.74
 
V. CONCLUSION
Without question, coastal State competency in the EEZ is strictly limited 
to resource rights, jurisdiction over resource-related offshore installations and 
ate in 1994, President Clinton stated that none of the peaceful purposes provisions of the Convention “cre-
ate new rights or obligations, imposes restraints upon military operations, or impairs the inherent right of 
self-defense. … More generally, military activities, which are consistent with the principles of international 
law, are not prohibited by these, or any other, provisions of the Convention.” Letter of Transmittal from 
President Bill Clinton, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, S. Treaty Doc. 103–39, 103rd 
Cong., at III and 94 (1994). A similar position was taken by President Bush in his 2004 letter of transmittal 
of the Convention to the Senate: “The United States understands that nothing in the Convention, including 
any provisions referring to ‘peaceful uses’ or ‘peaceful purposes,’ impairs the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense or rights during armed conflict.” United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
S. Exec. Rpt. 108-10, 108th Cong., § 3, at 16–17.
71  Virginia Commentary III, note 9 above, at 88-89.
72  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 227 (June 
27).  
73  S.C., 15th yr., 860th mtg., para. 87.
74  S.C., 15th yr., 883rd mtg., para. 187
Pete Pedrozo
492
structures and MSR, and protection of the marine environment. Coastal States 
do not retain residual security jurisdiction in the EEZ, and may not regulate 
lawful military activities in the EEZ that are consistent with the UN Charter, 
UNCLOS, the Chicago Convention, and other relevant international law in-
struments. 
Reflecting on this issue in 2008, Ambassador Tommy Koh recalled that 
“some coastal states would like the status of the EEZ to approximate the legal 
status of the territorial seas. Many other states held the view that the rights 
of the coastal States in the EEZ are limited to the exploitation of living and 
non-living resources and that the water column should be treated much like 
the high seas.” He went on to state that “I find a tendency on the part of 
some coastal States...to assert their sovereignty in the EEZ...[and doing so] 
is not consistent with the intention of those of us who negotiated this text, 
and is not consistent with the correct interpretation of this part [Part V] of the 
Convention.”75
All nations, particularly those that make excessive claims in their EEZ, 
should heed Ambassador Koh’s instructive analysis and abide by their treaty 
obligations. The creation of the EEZ was a package deal—coastal States were 
granted exclusive resource rights and user States retained the high seas free-
doms of navigation and overflight, and other lawful uses of the seas associated 
with those freedoms, which have always applied beyond the territorial sea.
75 Tommy T.B. Koh, “Remarks on the Legal Status of the Exclusive Economic Zone”, in Freedom of Seas, 
Passage Rights and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, Myron H. Nordquist, Tommy T.B. Koh & John 
Norton Moore, eds. (Virginia: BRILL, 2009), 53.
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